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The Oklahoma Community Property Act
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
HARRIET SPILLER DAGGETT*
The civilian system of community property has stood the
tests of social and economic changes from its virtually prehistoric
inception.' The reason for its longevity must ground upon the
fact that the system was founded upon a simple idea of justice
and respect for individual rights. The system has long existed in
eight states of this country.2 The ancestry is easily traced to
Spanish and French sources. Louisiana, the only state in the
group of eight which lays claim to civilian principles in toto, is
relatively free from common law disaffections of the ideal of
community property. In the other seven states, though the in-
fluence of common law ideas is strong, this one civilian trait has
been handed down despite disavowals of civilian family ties in
all other respects and clear adoption of the common law.
Commentators on family law, property law of husband and
wife, and the doctrine of individual rights in property have
praised the system of community property and have prophesied
the further adoption of its principles, with or without the name.2
Their forecasts have been predicated upon the natural sequence
to be expected from greater recognition of the rights of individ-
uals and larger participation by married women in business and
industry, due to changes in the economic life of the United States.
The eight original jurisdictions really gained the system, either
wholly or in part, by civilian inheritance. 4 The new addition of
* Professor of Civil Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Cole's Widow v. His Executors, 7 Mart. (N.S.) 41 (La. 1828). Cited in
Kephart, Origin of the Conjugal Community (1938); McCurdy, Cases Domes-
tic Relations (3 ed. 1939) 547; McKay, Community Property (1910) Introduc-
tion 36-37, and notes.
2. Arizona, California, Idaho, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, Washington,
Louisiana.
3. Burby, Cases on Community Property (1933) vii, preface.
4. "In California, Louisiana and Texas, the system was established by
the Spaniards, and has been continued by statute and code, but with some
modifications. In New Mexico, the Spanish system with slight modification
prevailed till 1901. Nevada and Arizona, while at one time Spanish territory,
never had a sufficient number of Spanish settlers to establish Spanish law,
and the system there is of statutory origin. In Idaho and Washington the
system is an exotic." McKay, op. cit. supra note 1, at 37-38, and note.
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Oklahoma 5 apparently was not due to the expected causes-i.e.,
the idea of implanting a more equitable property system for
spouses and of providing a family binder at a time of apparent
crisis in family relation. It would seem these considerations did
not sway the Oklahoma legislators and proponents so much as
the idea of saving federal income taxes for the better endowed
citizenry and preventing an exodus to nearby Texas, a community
property state, where the individual returns of husband and wife
under a tax theory of the latter's vested interest saved wealthy
spouses large sums in surcharges." Whatever the cause, the birth
of a new adherent must arouse pride and interest in the hearts of
the habitual believers and root stock members, though the philo-
sophically minded may think upon this environmental sport as
being a queer kinsman to the descendants from marauding tribes
whose uninvolved idea of justice and doubtless very real desire
for domestic tranquillity moved them to recognize the right of
the fighting wife to part of the spoils of war.7
Whether Oklahoma's new statute will be adjudged good, bad,
or indifferent for the citizenry in general, aside from tax savings,
remains to be seen. Its conformations to and divergencies from
the old pattern, with possible advantages or disadvantages, are
the subject of this discussion.
The act provides for a written election by husband and wife of
the community property regime and will operate only as to those
spouses who so elect.' In this wise, the system follows the Ger-
man,9 rather than the French and Spanish doctrine. The latter
two states and those deriving from them provide for community
property as the legal regime, operative by virtue of the act of
entering a valid marriage; 0 and the regime must be contracted
against if the parties do not desire it."
This Oklahoma "election" provision is an excellent one, at
5. Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1939)
tit. 32, §§ 51-65].
6. Letters received from C. C. Childers, Secretary of State, State of Okla-
homa, Oklahoma City, dated December 7, 1939; Julien C. Monnet, Dean,
School of Law, the University of Oklahoma, Norman, dated December 4,
1939; Charles W. Hamilton, Assistant Trust Officer, The National Bank of
Commerce, Houston, Texas, dated December 8, 1939.
7. McKay, loc. cit. supra note 1.
8. Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2, § 1 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, § 511.
9. Schuster, The Principles of German Law (1907) 499, and note.
10. Arts. 2325, 2399, La. Civil Code of 1870. See also Art. 133, La. Civil
Code of 1870, and La. Act 283 of 1928 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2169-2173].
11. Art. 2329, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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least for initiating the regime in new territory, as it gives in-
formed persons an immediate opportunity to avail themselves of
the benefits of the device and yet does not force it upon those
who have no knowledge of it or whose convictions are opposed.
Under the general run of. Spanish and French adherents in the
United States, the right to contract against the system, or to
modify it to individual purposes must be exercised before mar-
riage.12 In the United States, at least, the minds of those about to
contract marriage do not appear to center upon property laws
with as much interest before, as they do after, the ceremony.
After the choice has been made, Oklahoma appears to allow
no room for mind-changing, as the act provides that the regime
of community will then continue during the life of the marriage.18
However, the Oklahoma act, in a subsequent paragraph, cures the
apparent defect of this section by permitting the free transfer of
property between the spouses.14 Since third persons are well pro-
tected by recordation,15 there would appear to be no good reason
why spouses should not be permitted to readjust their property
affairs, if it should appear to them that their financial and family
interests would be served by the change. One of the defects of
the Louisiana system is the inability to contract after marriage8
or to reestablish the community after dissolution by a judgment
for separation of bed and board; though by reconciliation of the
spouses, the marriage and its attendant property rights remain
undisturbed in every other respect. 7 In France the community
may be reestablished under the latter situation. 8
The recordation provision of the new act 9 is particularly val-
uable. It requires that one copy of the written instrument indi-
cating election of the system by the spouses must be filed in the
county of the residence of the signers, and another must appear of
12. McKay, op. cit. supra note 1, at 213.
13. Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2, § 1 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, § 51].
14. Id. at § 9 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1939) tit. 32, § 59].
15. Ibid. See also § 2 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1939) tit. 32, § 52].
16. Arts. 2399, 2332, La. Civil Code of 1870; See Daggett, The Community
Property System of Louisiana (1931) 54, c. XI, The Wife's Action for a
Separation of Property. But see La. Act 236 of 1910, amending Article 2329,
and providing that married persons coming to Louisiana from another state
may contract against the community during the first year of their residence
in the state.
17. Comment (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 422.
18. Art. 1451, French Civil Code.
19. Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2, § 2 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, § 52].
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record in the office of the Secretary of State. Both of these offices
are required to keep and properly index records for this purpose.
There should be every possible protection for third parties through
this device, which relieves the situation of all domicile and land
location questions, simplifies the task of record searching for all
interested persons, resident or non-resident, and certainly mini-
mizes the ordinary risks incurred. Central registration systems
for mortgages of migratory chattels are in use in Oregon, Cali-
fornia, Idaho, and Nevada, and the idea of extension of use of the
device appears sound.2 0
Evidently anticipating many "elections" of the system by the
citizens of Oklahoma, the Secretary of State requested the Attor-
ney General,21 before the act went into effect, to prepare a form
"... in order to aid persons desiring to file said written elec-
tions, in easily, properly and uniformly preparing and execut-
ing the same in conformity with the provisions of [the act]...
and in order that said written elections might be promptly,
properly and uniformly recorded in a permanent record book
... on pages thereof printed in conformity with said blank
form."22
In accordance with this request, the Attorney General pre-
pared the following form:
WRITTEN ELECTION TO COME UNDER THE TERMS OF THE
OKLAHOMA COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW
2 3
W e .... ..................... and .........................
husband and wife, who reside in ..................... County,
Oklahoma, and whose post office address is ..................
. .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. . .. .. .. . . . ,. . . . . . . ... ,. . ,. . . . .. ,. . . . .. ,. . . . ..
(Set forth post office address in full)
do hereby state that we desire to avail ourselves of House Bill
No. 565 of the Seventeenth Legislature of the State of Okla-
homa, same being the Oklahoma Community Property Law,
and to have said law apply to us and to our property from and
after the first day of the next month subsequent to the filing of
20. Daggett, Privileges and Chattel Mortgage in Louisiana (in press)
notes 220, 221, 222, and 223.
21. Receipt of letter containing request (dated July 14th, 1939) acknowl-
edged by Attorney General Mac Q. Williamson in letter to Secretary of State
C. C. Childers (dated July 18th, 1939).
22. See page 1 of letter from Attorney General to Secretary of State, re-
ferred to in note 21, supra.
23. Copies of this form were furnished the writer by Secretary of State
Childers.
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duplicate originals hereof, one in the office of the county clerk
of the county of our residence and the other in the office of the
Secretary of State.
In Witness Whereof, we have hereunto set our hands on this,
the .................. day of ....................... 19.
State of Oklahoma SS
County of ....................
Before me ................................ , a Notary Public,
in and for the said county and state, on this ...................
day of ......................... ,19...., personally appeared
........................... an d ...........................
husband and wife, to me known to be the identical persons
who executed the within and foregoing instrument, and each
for themselves acknowledged to me that they executed the
same as their free and voluntary act and deed for the uses and
purposes therein set forth.
Witness my hand and seal the day and year last above written.
Notary Public
My commission expires ............................. ,19.....
Before the form was issued or the law in effect, however, an elec-
tion was tendered the Secretary of State, and he asked the At-
torney General for an opinion in regard to his duty in filing the
instrument and was advised that it was within his official discre-
tion to do so, even though the instrument did not "in substance"
set forth the data required by the act and was signed before the
effective date of the act. The Attorney General also stated that he
did not consider it necessary for the Secretary of State to insist
that persons use the official form prepared by him, though he felt
confident that cooperation would follow upon the furnishing of
the form.24 The fact that the premature election was upon a
printed form further indicates the expectancy of many elections.
The simple and businesslike methods used by these officers
will certainly facilitate the use of the system and will tend to
establish an early confidence in it. The lack of proper facilities
for the recordation of marriage contracts in Louisiana has doubt-
24. See page 3 of letter referred to in note 21, supra.
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less been at least one of the incidents of its lack of use in that
state.25 The recordation of chattel mortgages on automobiles, with
the Secretary of State, as well as in the county of the resident,
has been so successful in the states using that system that this
broader application is an interesting and valuable development,
which might well inspire emulation.26
The third and fourth sections of the Oklahoma act are iden-
tical, except for the fact that Section 3 deals with the separate
property of the husband, while Section 4 deals with the separate
property of the wife. These sections provide that "all property
owned or claimed" before the effective date of the election of the
system will be the separate property of the one owning or claim-
ing. The word "claimed" seems troublesome. It might only refer
to rights not yet fixed between a spouse and any third party, or
it might refer to claims of spouses, the one against the other. It
bodes trouble for the time of settlement of a community at dis-
solution by death or divorce, as it may present the need for evi-
dence which would be difficult to get, both because of its nature
and the lapse of time. Neither this section nor any other appears
to contemplate a declaration at the time of election as to what is
to be separate and community property; though neither is there
any prohibition against what might be but an inventory which in
after years would greatly facilitate a settlement between spouses
or heirs. This device is in use in some sections of Louisiana and
has proved to be a very practical aid. These inventories are
labelled marriage contracts-somewhat of a misnomer, as the real
elements of the marriage contract are seldom present; however,
the use is unquestionable. 27 Again, the lack of a settlement pro-
vision in Oklahoma at the inception of the system by election
would preclude the wife from sharing in her husband's accumula-
tions throughout a long period of married life; and, after adoption
of the system, wife or husband might be robbed of such protection
as the common law devices previously afforded. If a dissolution
of the marriage and consequent termination of the community
should occur before additional assets which would fall under the
community property act were accumulated, this might prove to
be very serious in many cases.
The provision for separate property acquired after the elec-
25. Daggett, op. cit. supra note 16, at 114, c. XVIII, The Marriage Con-
tract.
26. See note 20, supra.
27. Daggett, op. cit. supra note 16, at 113.
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tion presents several interesting items.28 Gifts of the husband's
or wife's interest in the community are listed. This might easily
cure the difficulty noted above, if the individual was willing, of
course; if not, the legal protection of the one without property
remains precarious. An unscrupulous, penurious, or careless
spouse with means might well leave the other without protection
from either the newly elected civilian institution or the benefit
of common law safeguards. This contingency is well guarded
against in the civil law by the so-called "marital portion" pro-
vision. If one spouse dies, leaving the other "relatively" poor,
the latter may demand the marital portion in the nature of a
forced share of separate property, common property, or both, so
that his or her financial station may not too abruptly descend.
This has proved to be a salutary principle and is often resorted
to for relief.29
The new act speaks also of separate property vesting after
the election "by division of community."30 This clause suggests
a voluntary division, as legal dissolution occurs only by absolute
divorce or death.2 1 The civilian idea does not comprehend this
possibility. A division by a legal dissolution may occur by virtue
of a judgment for separation of bed and board or by a successful
suit for separation of property. 2 The latter action is available
only to the wife, however, and then only if the husband's finan-
cial situation becomes precarious.9
Devise and descent are also means of acquiring separate
property after election of the system in Oklahoma. This is com-
mon to all community states, though the civil law provision adds
that if gifts, inter vivos or mortis causa, are made jointly to the
spouses, the property is then community; 4 this apparently would
not be the case under the Oklahoma statute, but the property
would be joint, which obviously is not the same thing.
Provision for increase of lands individually owned as being
28. Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2, § 6 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, § 56].
29. Daggett, op. cit. supra note 16, at 93, c. XVI, Rights of a Surviving
Spouse.
30. Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2, §§ 3, 4 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, §§ 53, 54].
31. Id. at § 1 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1939) tit. 32, § 51].
32. Daggett, op. cit. supra note 16, at 52, c. X, Dissolution of the Com-
munity.
33. Daggett, The Wife's Action for a Separation of Property (1930) 5
Tulane L. Rev. 55.
34. Art. 2402, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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separate property is made.3 The corresponding civilian rule is
stated more cumbersomely, and the meaning is not necessarily the
equivalent. The separate property of one spouse in Oklahoma
is not liable for debts or torts of the other, either before or after
election, "except as may be permitted by law as to his or her
property prior to the enactment of" the new act.37
Section 5 provides that "all property or moneys received as
compensation for personal injuries, sustained either by the hus-
band or the wife shall be the separate property of the person sus-
taining such injuries."38
Oklahoma is indeed to be congratulated on these three sec-
tions, which treat the two spouses exactly alike. A new start
naturally has a great advantage over an old base, upon which it
is sometimes different to quickly graft changes which become
necessary because of difficult social and economic conditions. In
Louisiana the income from the husband's separate property falls
into the community, while that of the wife's does not, unless her
separate estate is under the sole administration of the husband.3 9
Again, while compensation for personal injury to the wife falls
into her separate estate, 4 this is not true of the husband, unless
he is living separate and apart from his wife with cause sufficient
upon which to ground judgment for separation.4' Not only does
this throw the rights of the spouses out of balance, but it is against
the best interests of the family and society; for in order for the
husband to claim compensation as his separate property, he would
be required to make the same type of proof necessary in a separa-
tion suit-matter which he doubtless did not care to put of public
record, or he would already have asked for separation.
The wife's earnings, under rather clear Louisiana statutory
language, belong to the wife's separate estate; but in order to
prevent another item of unbalance, the court has declared them
community property.42
35. Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2, § 3, 4 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, §§ 53, 54].
36. Art. 2408, La. Civil Code of 1870.
37. Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2, § 3, 4 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, 33 53, 54].
38. Id. at § 5 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1939) tit. 32, § 55].
39. Daggett, op. cit. supra note 16, at 6, c. II, The Property of the Com-
munity.
40. La. Act 68 of 1902, amending Art. 2402, La. Civil Code of 1870.
41. La. Act 186 of 1920.
42. La. Acts 170 of 1912 and 186 of 1920, amending Art. 2334, La. Civil
Code of 1870; Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
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Under the civil law, the husband has never been responsible
for his wife's torts, as the idea of individual rights and responsi-
bility has always characterized the civilian philosophy, and the
merger doctrine of the common law was never accepted in any
aspect.4" A rather unsatisfactory situation is now present in Lou-
isiana, however, arising out of the use of automobiles. The so-
called family car doctrine is not accepted in Louisiana, so that
victims of the careless driving of married women without prop-
erty are left with a vacant right, except for the suggested possi-
bility that if the married woman was about the business of the
community, the latter could be held on that theory. This presents
other complications, in that the theory of the wife's agency has
been repudiated hitherto by the court, so far as dealing with the
community is concerned. 44 The idea of agency for the purchase of
necessities, for example, has been upheld on the general, and not
necessarily community, doctrine of the husband's responsibility
for his wife's support.45
When is the wife about the business of the community? It
has been held that she is not so acting when attending a style
show in a neighboring city, even though the accident occurred
while she was en route to a restaurant for her midday meal. This
eating was an incident to the style show attendance, her own
personal business, and not a part of the husband's or the com-
munity business. In this, the first Louisiana Supreme Court case
in point, was found the intimation that had this wife been about
the community business, the community would have been liable.4"
Another case 4T raising the problem reached the Supreme Court
the following year. The wife was held not to have been about the
community business while collecting and transporting groceries
furnished by others in connection with a charitable project upon
which an organization to which she belonged was engaged. Stress
was laid upon the fact that the husband had previously expressed
43. Daggett, The Civil-Law Concept of the Wife's Position in the Family
(1936) 15 Ore. L. Rev. 293, and n. 12.
44. Daggett, op. cit. supra note 16, at 19, c. III, Management and Dis-
position of the Community, § May Wife Act as Agent?; Knoblock & Rainold
v. Posey, 126 La. 610, 52 So. 847 (1910); Mitchell v. Dixie Ice Co., 157 La. 383,
102 So. 497 (1925).
45. Hellwig v. West, 2 La. Ann. 1 (1847). See Art. 120, La. Civil Code of
1870; Van Horn v. Arantes, 116 La. 130, 40 So. 592 (1906); Schaeffer v.
Trascher, 165 La. 315, 115 So. 575 (1928); L. Feibleman & Co. v. O'Rourke, 124
So. 620 (La. App. 1929); Daggett, op. cit. supra note 16, at 48, c. IX, Creditors'
Rights.
46. Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937).
47. Matulich v. Crockett, 184 So. 748 (La. App. 1938).
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disapproval of this activity, an element which in an ordinary
agency case would not have carried much weight in and under
similar circumstances. The court stated:
"We are not prepared to say, nor do we hold, that a wife
engaged upon a charitable mission is not the agent of the com-
munity as we feel that the dispensing of alms may, under or-
dinary circumstances, be considered as part of the functions
of community life. But, here, it is shown that Mr. Crockett
had nothing whatsoever to do with the benevolent work-per-
formed by his wife as a member of the Victory Girls and that
he had many times expressed his disapproval of her avid in-
terest in that society. '48
In a third case49 the circuit court of appeals held that the
wife was not acting as the agent of either the husband or the
community when visiting the husband's mother, who was ill, as
she had delivered to the mother nothing that was purchased with
community funds, and had used the car against the husband's
expressed injunction.
Third persons, as well as the wife, suffer by the court's re-
fusal to recognize and apply the tools furnished by the legisla-
ture and designed to gear the law of husband and wife to an order
of society changed economically, socially, and mechanically from
the era when all outside activities could be handled by the hus-
band. Physical control without legal responsibility has always
been regarded as a dangerous situation, for society, as well as for
the individual. Had the married women in these three cases out-
lined above been "gainfully employed without the home"-their
"gains" being community property-and had they been about the
procurement of these, gains, would the community have been
liable? Could the community have been sued for the act of the
wife as agent, recalling that she cannot sue?
Again, if the acts of Louisiana are to be interpreted as not
having changed the old law prohibiting suits between husband
and wife, just what is the managing husband with full control of
community to do, short of committing murder or mayhem, when
his wife refuses to turn over valuable personal property of the
community to him? This question has already demanded the
attention of the practicing lawyer, if not the courts.
48. Id. at 750.
49. Wise v. Smith, 186 So. 857 (La. App. 1939).
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The Oklahoma provisions regarding mutual freedom of sep-
arate property from individual debts contracted by the other
spouse are similar to those of Louisiana.50
The provision of Section 6 of the Oklahoma act that all prop-
erty not specifically designated in the preceding sections as being
separate will fall into the community is usual. The provision in
the same section that all community property "shall be vested"
as an "undivided one-half interest" in husband and wife is clear
and takes care of the income tax situation, toward which the en-
tire act apparently was largely directed.
This "vesting" has more elements of reality than does that
of Louisiana, however, where the property appears to be vested
for taxation purposes only; as neither the wife nor her creditors
have any rights in it or against it during the existence of the
community.51
The control provisions of Section 6 of the Oklahoma act are
particularly desirable and stand out for commendation when com-
pared with Louisiana law.
52
"The wife shall have the management and control and may
dispose of that portion of the community property consisting
of her earnings, all rents, interest, dividends, incomes and
other profits for her separate estate and all other community
property the title to which stands in her name."5 8
In Louisiana, as previously stated, the income from the wife's
separate estate is her separate property when she is administering
her estate, which she may do, even through an agent; and that
agent may be her husband.
However, by judicial decree, if not legislation, her earnings
are community property and, hence, are under the full power and
control of her husband. They may be disposed of, even given
away, by the husband; they are liable for his debts, as well as
those of the community; and they are not liable for the claims of
her creditors. The most anomalous situation of all is that the wife
50. Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2, §§ 3, 4 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, § 53, 54]; Art. 2408, La. Civil Code of 1870; Daggett, op. cit.
supra note 16, at 48, c. IX, Creditors' Rights.
51. Daggett, The Modern Problem of the Nature of the Wife's Interest
in Community Property-A Comparative Study (1931) 19 Calif. L. Rev. 567.
52. Daggett, Is Joint Control of Community Property Possible? -(1936) 10
Tulane L. Rev. 589.
53. Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2, § 6 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, § 56].
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is not permitted to sue to protect her own contract (which she
is entirely free to make) because of the fact that "her earnings
when carrying on a business, trade, occupation or industry sep-
arate from her husband" have been held to be community prop-
ertyA' Here we have a situation for which there is no parallel:
A person, sui juris in every respect, who needs no authorization
to contract, must call a stranger to the contract to protect it.55
Again, the Oklahoma statute takes care of another situation which
is subject to criticism in Louisiana. The new act states, as quoted
above, that "the wife shall have the management and control and
may dispose ... of all ... community property the title to which
stands in her name. '5 6 A Louisiana act of 1912 provides that
"when the title to community property stands in the name of the
wife, it cannot be mortgaged or sold by the husband without her
written authority or consent. '57 This negative, rather than affirma-
tive, move toward giving the wife a form of control over property
in which she has a barren, "presently vested" interest has been
further limited by judicial decisions declaring that the wife can-
not deal with this property without the husband's consent. 8 The
court has ignored the implications of this act by holding further
that if community property stands in the joint names of husband
and wife, the husband, as "head and master of the community,"
may deal as he sees fit with the property without the consent of
the wife. 9
Thus, it is apparent that such feeble attempts as have been
made legislatively to provide for some control of portions of the
community property by the wife have been emasculated by the
court, which, at the same time, however, interpreted the legisla-
tive edict regarding the character of earnings, et cetera, in favor
of the community.
The trend against the wife's participation is not only con-
trary to the civilian ideal of individualism of the spouses and
to the flow of social, economic, and political lines of thought and
action, but, more seriously, is inimical to the best interests of the
family. There are at least two reasons for this. First, the robbing
54. See note 42, supra.
55. Daggett, supra note 52, at 598.
56. Note 53, supra.
57. La. Act 170 of 1912.
58. Norman Mayer & Co. v. Montgomery, 187 La. 374, 174 So. 880 (1937).
59. Young v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 184 La. 460, 166 So. 139 (1936);
Otwell v. Vaughan, 186 La. 911, 173 So. 527 (1937). See also LeRosen v. North
Central Texas Oil Co., 169 La. 973, 126 So. 442 (1930) and Clingman v. Devo-
nian Oil Co., 188 La. 310, 177 So. 59 (1937).
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of the wife of any feeling of financial independence and respon-
sibility, and the discouragement and sense of injustice attendant
upon adding funds to an estate in which no legal control or actual
present ownership exists causes in most cases a reaction that in
no way adds to the tranquillity and stability of the home. In the
second place, no legal, honorable, and unsuspicious method is
provided whereby a portion of the family earnings can be made
safe from creditors or can be handled in a conservative manner
against possible depression or financial reverses. When some part
of the family income is immune from seizure, one spouse, usually
the husband, is set free from worry and may conduct his business
with greater boldness, with greater chances for gain, and with
favorable results upon family happiness, aside and apart from
purely financial aspects. This philosophy has ceased to be a mat-
ter of conjecture and has been demonstrated by many social
studies.60 The disintegration of the American family shown by a
divorce rate of one to six marriages 6l in the United States has
centered the attention of all socially interested groups upon the
family as a major social problem, so that emphasis upon the
public or social policy of the property question is not idle dis-
cussion.
The usual homestead provision is found in the Oklahoma act
as a limitation on the husband's control over the community
property.
The following provision regarding bank deposits is of in-
terest:
".... any funds on deposit in any bank or banking institution,
whether in the name of the husband or the wife, shall be pre-
sumed to be the separate property of the party in whose name
they stand, regardless of who made the deposit, and unless
said bank or banking institution is notified to the contrary, it
shall be governed accordingly in honoring checks and orders
against such account. '6 2
The Louisiana provision is quite different and appears in this
language:
"Money or other property deposited in said banks by mar-
60. Jacobs and Angell, A Research in Family Law (1930) 647, citing Miss
Hildegarde Kneeland (May, 1929) 143 Annals 38.
61. Ogburn, The Family and its Functions (1933) 1 Recent Social Trends,
c. 13; Frank, The Family as Cultural Agent (1940) Living 16.
62. Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2, § 6 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, § 56].
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ried women or minors themselves may be drawn out by them
upon their own order or signature without other authoriza-
tion."63
The court has said in reference to this statute that a deposit to
the credit of both husband and wife "was not subject to the un-
conditional control and order of the husband" 64 and, hence, held
a mineral lease to have expired for non-payment of rentals, since
the husband, lessor of community property, should have alone
received the funds from the lessee. 5 The fact that the wife had
not touched the funds and that the husband knew they were in the
bank made no difference. This decision certainly warned off any
payments of this nature to husband and wife jointly and, hence,
again reduced any effect of joint control of the community that
the banking statute might have had; yet, it certainly does not
make separate property of deposits in the individual names.
Under the joint control idea of the Oklahoma statute, credi-
tors are even better protected than are Louisiana creditors under
the "husband as head and master"66 system. Section 7 of the
Oklahoma act provides:
"The separate property of the wife and that portion of
community property, record title to which is in her name or
which is under the management, control and disposition of
the wife, shall be subject to debts contracted by the wife aris-
ing out of tort, or otherwise, but not to debts or liabilities of
the husband. The separate property of the husband and that
portion of the community property, record title to which is in
his name or which is under the management, control and dis-
position of the husband shall be subject to debts contracted
by the husband or liabilities of the husband arising out of
tort or otherwise, but not the debts or liabilities of the wife.
The husband and the wife, and each of them, shall be entitled
to the exemptions to which they, or either of them, are now
entitled under the laws existing prior to the enactment of this
A ct."
67  ,
The placement of the conjunction "or" indicates that the wife
63. La. Act 189 of 1902, § 1(8) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 639]. In La. Act 45
of 1902, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 584], the same provision appears.
64. LeRosen v. North Central Texas Oil Co., 169 La. 973, 126 So. 442 (1930);
Clingman v. Devonian Oil Co., 188 La. 310, 177 So. 59 (1937).
65. Ibid.
66. Art. 2404, La. Civil Code of 1870.
67. Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2, § 7 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, § 57].
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may also manage and control community property, the title of
which is not necessarily in her name; as, for example, a car.
Section 9 provides for full transfer power between the spouses
of the community. This makes it possible, without provision for
a "marriage contract," for readjustment of property rights be-
tween the spouses, for a virtual discarding of the community
system, if it is found to be unsatisfactory, or for a re-entrance into
it later. In Louisiana the husband may give to his wife what he
could give to a stranger.6 8 Because of revocation provisions69 and
because of the doctrine of forced heirship,70 such gifts (as all
others, for that matter) are never safe from the possibility of re-
duction,7'1 after death of the donor, at the hands of forced heirs;
hence, this manipulation of community property is not very
practical or reliable. The full power in Oklahoma to transfer
back and forth makes it perfectly possible for spouses to deal
with each other and settle or adjust their property rights between
themselves, which should go far to stabilize and secure the mar-
riage and, hence, the family. This is accomplished, furthermore,
with full protection to creditors by virtue of the following pro-
vision:
"No creditor shall have recourse to the community prop-
erty for the payment of debts or liabilities created by either
the husband or the wife, except as provided in Section 7 of
this Act; provided, however, that any creditor may satisfy his
claim or demand out of the community property which was
under the management, control and disposition of the spouse
incurring the indebtedness or liability at the time the debt or
liability was contracted or created, and which has been sub-
sequently conveyed or transferred to the other spouse and is
under the management, control and disposition of said other
spouse, without proof that said creditor relied upon said com-
munity property in advancing said credit, but without preju-
dice to the rights of the third party purchasers, incumbrancers,
or other creditors or grantees; and provided further, that the
husband or wife on paying community debts shall, as between
themselves, charge the same against community property.'7 2
68. Art. 1746, La. Civil Code of 1870.
69. Art. 1749, La. Civil Code of 1870.
70. Art. 1495, La. Civil Code of 1870.
71. Arts. 1502-1518, La. Civil Code of 1870; Daggett, General Principles
of Succession on Death in Civil Law (1937) 11 Tulane L. Rev. 400.
72. Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2, § 8 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, § 581.
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These provisions for joint control are most progressive and just.
They preserve the ideal of the common fund, which those states
establishing the wife's earnings as separate property do not do;
yet they avoid the unprecedented position of Louisiana, which
declares the wife's earnings community property, and at the same
time, denies her the supposedly inalienable right of a person sui
juris to protect her contract.
Furthermore, the freedom of contract between the spouses,
enabling them to adjust property differences between themselves
and to anchor a sinking fund in the hands of one spouse for the
safety of the family, should financial disaster overtake the more
active partner, is an excellent measure to secure both emotional
and financial stability for the family-the basic unit of civiliza-
tion.
In Louisiana, despite the sweeping terms of the so-called
married women emancipatory acts, the court has shown the same
reactionary attitude instanced above toward the matter of con-
tract between husband and wife, and, while admitting the valid-
ity of a joint mineral lease of husband and wife and enforcing it
against a third party, refused to make a flat statement regarding
the power of husband and wife to contract freely.7 s This attitude
is particularly hard to understand, when, even before the wife
was freed from the necessity of authorization by the husband,
certain contracts were permitted; and the courts of that earlier
day allowed the wife to establish an agency relation with her
husband in order to preserve the income from her separate estate
as her separate property.7 4 While it may be debatable that the
agency relationship is a true contract, since certain elements,
notably that of consideration, are absent, the theory of distinction
is academic in a situation of this kind.
Undoubtedly many wealthy couples in Oklahoma will avail
themselves of the community property regime, to decrease their
taxes, if for no other reason; as the act apparently would not have
been passed but for this consideration as a basis for the public
demand. It will be most interesting to observe the reaction of
those citizens who fall financially below the affected tax bracket.
Certainly, it will be some time before the general laity will be
sufficiently informed to make an intelligent election, but when
knowledge has seeped through, it may well be that spouses will
73. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., 185 La. 751,
170 So. 785 (1936).
74. Miller v. Handy, 33 La. Ann. 160 (1881).
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avail themselves of the institution for reasons other than tax
savings. There is certainly no assurance, however, that families
without expectancy of financial advantage will ever elect the
system, which in most cases doubtless is foreign to their property
traditions.
Section 10 of the Oklahoma act is one part of the new
legislation which, in the writer's judgment, is subject to serious
criticism.
"In the event of the dissolution of marriage by decree of
any court of competent jurisdiction, community property shall
be divided between the parties by the court granting the de-
cree, in such proportions as such court, from the facts in the
case, shall deem just and equitable, and such division shall be
subject to revision on appeal in all respects including the
exercise of discretion by the court below. '75
It has been previously observed that the shares of the spouses
are presently vested interests; in fact, this is the acknowledged
chief motivation for the passage of the act. It follows that Section
10 may well be declared invalid as a violation of due process.
Furthermore, and aside from questions of constitutionality, the
section strikes at the root of the fine individualistic qualities of
the act and defeats the sense of confidence and justice upon
which the spouses should, for the best interests of the family, be
able to rely. This section follows the common law dilution of the
community property ideal, found in all members of the group
of eight in the United States except Louisiana, the most
loyal adherent to the original civilian concept.76 Louisiana, ad-
mitting no punitive damages 7  in ordinary contract or tort, admits
none in breach of the marriage vows, so far as property laws are
concerned. 7s No matter what the marital wrong may have been
which resulted in legal dissolution of the community, the prop-
erty of the community belongs, half and half, to the spouses,
guilty or innocent.7 9 Oklahoma is to be congratulated on the con-
trol provisions which instance a present vested interest in the
75. Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2, § 10 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, § 60].
76. Burby, Cases on Community Property (1933) 300n; Daggett, Division
of Property upon Dissolution of Marriage (1939) 6 Law and Contemp. Prob.
225; McKay, Community Property (1910) 39 et seq.
77. See Vincent v. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027,
74 So. 541 (1917).





wife as well as the husband. These provisions are more con-
vincing than is the legal status in Louisiana, where adherence to
the theory of the wife's vested interest amounts to little more
than lip-service, because neither the wife nor her creditors can
exercise any control over the community property until dissolu-
tion of the community. Consequently, the Oklahoma provision
for property penalty upon divorce appears even more contradic-
tory than in those states which follow the Louisiana provisions
for control in the husband alone. Louisiana did not even carry
over the Spanish provision for penalizing a wife guilty of adultery
by the forfeiture of her share of the community. 80 This fact was
heavily stressed in brief of counsel8' successfully arguing before
the United States Supreme Court that the wife in Louisiana had
a present vested interest in community property.82 The only pen-
alty of this nature incorporated into the law of Louisiana through
her jurisprudence is in a putative marriage, where the Spanish
provision for punishing a bigamous husband by forfeiture of his
share of the community in favor of the wife in good faith is en-
forced.8 Even admitting, for purposes of argument, that a prop-
erty penalty for marital wrong is desirable, then the "crime" and
its punishment should be defined and not left to the discretion of
a judge to determine and administer according to his particular
views as to the enormity of the offense or according to his own
peculiar ideas of justice. A petty infringer upon the rights of
society and the good conduct of the community has more pro-
tection than is offered by this statute to the offending spouse.
The failure to distinguish between the emotional side of a
marriage and the property rights of the individuals to the con-
tract has already done incalculable harm to the integrity and
security of the family, and the carrying forward of a pernicious
idea into an otherwise fair and forward-looking piece of legisla-
tion is indeed regrettable.
Alimony is a form of property punishment, grounded, how-
ever, upon the duty of the husband to support his wife and upon
the public policy of preventing her becoming a charge upon the
80. Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98, 106
(1846).
81. Brief No. 86, filed by Spencer, Gidiere, Phelps & Dunbar, Monroe &
Lemann, in case of Bender v. Pfaff on writ of certiorari to the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, pp. 33, 34.
82. Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127, 51 S.Ct. 64, 75 L.Ed. 252 (1930).
83. Daggett, op. cit. supra note 16, at 117, c. XIX, Community as a Civil
Effect of a Putative Marriage.
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state. It is adjusted to income and need; it does not go to the
lengths of disturbing vested property rights, and if carefully
awarded, may be justified in proper cases;8' despite this fact, it
is common knowledge that it is one of the bitterest and most hard
fought issues in connection with divorce. It is the subject of
fraud and connivance; it is in many cases practically impossible
to collect. In many instances, it wrecks both financially and emo-
tionally, the second family which one of the parties to the first
and unsuccessful union attempts to found.8 5 The alleged unfair-
ness of the awards, the pleas of prejudice, and virtual seduction
of the judge have been the subject of both serious and comic
literature for decades. With this precedent it is strange that a
legal provision, infinitely more disturbing to the sense of justice
of the individual spouse, though certainly easier to administer,
should be incorporated into the law of a state initiating a new
venture in the property law of husband and wife.
Sections 11, 12, 13, and 14 of the Oklahoma act deal with the
process of transferring control of community property under the
management of one spouse to that of the other in cases where
".... the husband or the wife is non compos mentis, or has been
convicted of a felony or sentenced to imprisonment for a period
of more than one year, . . . or whenever the husband or the
wife is an habitual drunkard, or for any other reason is in-
capacitated to manage, control, or dispose of the commun-
ity. . .
This provision in concise form takes care of situations man-
aged by various, separately outlined processes in other community
property states. In Louisiana, for example, for insanity and habit-
ual drunkenness, an individual may be interdicted,81 and a curator
appointed. The husband is of right the curator of his wife, and
the wife "may be appointed curatrix to her husband, if she has,
in other respects, the necessary qualifications. '" '8 The case of
absentees is covered by a special title of the Code,89 and prefer-
ence for the curatorship is in the wife if the husband is an ab-
sentee.90 Again, the spouse of an absentee may continue the
84. Symposium on Alimony (1939) 6 Law and Contemp. Prob. 183.
85. Gantz v. Wagner, 188 La. 833, 178 So. 367 (1938).
86. Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2, § 11 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, § 61].
87. Arts. 389-426, La. Civil Code of 1870.
88. Arts. 412, 413, La. Civil Code of 1870.
89. Arts. 47-85, La. Civil Code of 1870.
90. Art. 48, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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community, if so desired, by preventing the heirs from being put
into provisional possession."1 Power of attorney may be used in
general. Since virtually the entire control of the community, ex-
cept in Oklahoma, is vested in the husband, the incapacity of a
wife is relatively unimportant.
The Oklahoma statute provides that the judgment declaring
the incapacity of a spouse and transferring control entirely to the
other spouse "shall be recorded in the office of the county clerk
of the county where any property affected thereby is situated
and such judgment when so rendered shall be notice of the facts
therein set out."9 2 Apparently the recordation machinery in the
office of the Secretary of State for filing "elections" will not be
used for the purpose of recording these judgments, so it will be
necessary to search the county records. Since the control affects
both real and personal property, the sites of which are not neces-
sarily the same as the owner's residence or domicile, record
searching may not be an easy matter. It is regrettable that the
central system was not preserved throughout for the conduct of
community affairs.
The final section of the Oklahoma act provides for settlement
of the community upon the death of a spouse. "All debts of the
community, whether created by the husband or the wife" 98 must
be paid, and one-half of the residue transferred by the surviving
spouse to the administrator or executor of the deceased.
"Upon the death of the husband or the wife, the surviving
spouse shall administer all community property in the same
manner and with the same duties, privileges and authority as
are vested in a surviving partner to administer and settle the
affairs of a partnership upon the death of the other part-
ner ..
This businesslike method of settlement is commendable. The law
and jurisprudence of Louisiana are firmly established to the
effect that the community property system is not a partnership
and that the rules of partnership do not apply. 5 Many of the
91. Art. 64, La. Civil Code of 1870.
92. Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2, § 14 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, § 64].
93. Id. at § 15 [Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1939) tit. 32, § 65].
94. Ibid.
95. Art. 2807, La. Civil Code of 1870; Dorvin v. Wiltz, 11 La. Ann. 514
(1856); Bartoli v. Huguenard, 39 La. Ann. 411, 2 So. 196 (1887); Frierson v.
Frierson, 164 La. 687, 114 So. 594 (1927); Falconer v. Falconer, 167 La. 595,
120 So. 19 (1929); Mackenroth v. Pelke, 171 La. 842, 132 So. 365 (1931).
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difficulties and inequities of administration and settlement might
be obviated if partnership law could be applied. The defects of
settlement provisions of Oklahoma after dissolution of the com-
munity by divorce are even more marked in contrast to the ex-
cellent provisions for settlement upon dissolution by death. Under
a real vested interest law and a socially conscious attitude toward
divorce, the settlement in general should be the same, and in
Louisiana it is the same. Certain inequities in this regard, deal-
ing with the matter of the right of the wife to accept the com-
munity with benefit of inventory, formerly existing in the law
of Louisiana, have been removed by judicial decision96 and later
confirmed by legislative act T
Louisiana very properly makes provision for renunciation or
acceptance with benefit of inventory of the community by the
wife because she should not be held personally for obligations
which she had no voice in making. Under the dual control idea
of Oklahoma such a provision is not necessary, even in settle-
ment, because only the residue after all community debts are paid
goes to the surviving spouse; and apparently a residue of assets,
not obligations, is intended.
The Oklahoma act is more than fair to the spouse who has
property, who earns money, or who has a generous partner will-
ing to give a portion of his property to the other. For the idle
partner, or one-usually the wife-whose duty it is to be a home-
keeper only, not as much power or protection is afforded as by
the old civil law.
If the wife has no separate property, does not earn anything
outside her home, and receives no gifts from her husband, she
has but a barren, "vested" half interest in the community, which
might be taken from her upon divorce and which is absolutely
in the control of the husband, to give, gamble, or gobble up at his
pleasure. The one restriction upon him is in regard to the home-
stead. Even if the wife has separate property, all income and
profit from it except the increase of lands goes into the commun-
ity, though she may control rents, revenues, et cetera. The act
does little for the old fashioned wife, who makes her contribution
to the community (and it is an unquestionably valuable and real
96. Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926).
97. La. Act 49 of 1926, repealing Art. 2420, La. Civil Code of 1870. For
discussion, see Daggett, op. cit. supra note 16, at 75 et seq., c. XIII, Accept-
ance or Renunciation of the Community.
1940]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
contribution) by attending the home, rearing the children, and
assisting her husband in countless ways.
In Louisiana, besides the homestead98 and so-called "family
home"9 9 restrictions upon the husband's power of control of the
community property, there are limitations on his power to give
away community property'00 or to dispose of it with a view to
defrauding his wife. 01 These statutes are valuable safeguards,
even though the community must have been dissolved or be in
contemplation of dissolution in order that the wife may bring an
action for actual recovery. The action for a separation of property
which may be brought by the wife under certain conditions 0 2 is
a legal avenue of escape from the community regime, when it
becomes burdensome to the wife's estate, which Oklahoma does
not provide. Mutual agreement is necessary under the new act for
any manipulation of the community property, and, if one refuses,
there seems to be no legal relief provided.
Any movement for more equitable adjustment of property
rights of husband and wife is welcome to those who are interested
in the preservation of the family during this stressful period of
economic adjustment. The good of the Oklahoma statute certainly
outweighs such defects as the new law may be thought to possess.
After a few years of trial, if the new property regime gains favor
with the people, it will be an easy matter for statutory adjust-
ments to be made as their need is proved. It may be that Con-
gress will wipe out the tax advantages of the community prop-
erty system now enjoyed, but the ideal of a fair and equitable
system of property laws for two people who are working together
for the benefit of a family will never die, and Oklahoma is to be
congratulated on joining the ranks of these believers, whatever
the immediate cause of her initiation.
98. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XI, § 3; Nona Mills Co. v. Swain, 125 La. 233,
51 So. 128 (1910); Jefferson v. Herold, 144 La. 1064, 81 So. 714 (1919). La.
Const. of 1898, Art. 246 is practically the same as La. Const. of 1921, Art. XI,
§ 3, and identical as to the specific clause in question.
99. La. Act 35 of 1925.
100. Art. 2404, La. Civil Code of 1870.
101. See Daggett, op. cit. supra note 16, at 23, c. IV, Limitations upon
Husband's Powers as Head of Community.
102. Note 33, supra.
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